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1 A Story
Mr Holt, the kindergarten teacher, gives his class these instructions:
Hello class, The Metropolitan Museum of Art has a sudden shortage of
sculptures and needs several new ones to fill its shelves. Please break into
groups so that each group can build a Lego tower. The director of the
museum will be here in an hour to pick up the towers and put them in
the museum with your names on them. Please do the best job you can;
you don’t want to be professionally embarrassed.
Each kindergartener wants to be in a group with her friends, but she also wants
her friends to be happy in the group; she doesn’t want her friends to be miserable.
The graph below is a map of who is friends with whom in the small class. Notice
that a would have more friends in the group {a, b, c, d, e} than {a, b, c, d}, but
maybe a doesn’t want e to be in the group because a knows that would make b,
c, and d less happy. Strangely, a prefers {a, b, c, d} to {a, b, c, d, e}.
You can imagine that the kindergarteners might try to choose the best group
in some other way. The class would split into groups one way, but then people
would be unhappy and keep changing their groups. How can we model all this?
How could we easily visualize all this?
2 Hedonic Games
Below is the original definition of a hedonic game. Hedonic games [Banerjee,
Konishi, and So¨nmez, 2001] were invented to model the formation and reforma-
tion of groups.
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Definition 1. [Banerjee, Konishi, and So¨nmez, 2001] A coalition formation
game is a pair G = (N, (i)i∈N ), where N is a finite set of players and for
every i ∈ N , i is a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on N i =
{C ∈ 2N : i ∈ C}. If C,D ∈ N i and C i D and D 6i C, then we write
C i D.
Definition 2. [Banerjee, Konishi, and So¨nmez, 2001] A coalition structure
Γ = {C1, . . . , Ck} is a partition of N . The coalition containing a player i ∈ N
is denoted Γ (i). Any subset of N is called a coalition.
That’s a very minimal definition, and these most general hedonic games don’t
have many computationally useful properties. For that reason, several subclasses
of hedonic games have been invented and studied. First though, let’s look at
stability.
2.1 The Core
If Mr Holt were assigning groups, instead of letting the kids form their own
groups, then he might want a way to predict if a given partition will stick before
he actually moves people around. “Will the students stay in their groups or will
they form new ones?” There are many ways you can ask the question “Is this
coalition formation stable?” Seven good ways are mentioned in [Nguyen, Rey,
Rey, Rothe, and Schend, 2016]. One of the most important ways to ask the
question (and the focus of the survey [Woeginger, 2013]) is “Is this this coalition
formation core stable?”.
Definition 3. In a hedonic game G with a partition Γ , if there is a nonempty
set C ⊆ N where ∀i ∈ C : C i Γ (i), then we say that C blocks Γ , or C is a
blocking coalition in Γ . If Γ cannot be blocked, then it is called core stable.
The set of core stable partitions for a game G is called the core of G.
3 Varieties of Hedonic Games
In the below paragraphs, n = |N | is the number of players, i is a player in N ,
and C,D ∈ N i are coalitions which contain i.
3.1 Fractional Hedonic Games
[Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein, 2014] In fractional hedonic games, i assigns
some real value vi(j) to every player j ∈ N . It’s assumed that vi(i) = 0.1 We
say C FRi D if uFRi (C) ≥ uFRi (D), where
uFRi (C) =
∑
j∈C
vi(j).
1 Raising your own score is equivalent to lowering everyone else’s score. Lowering
your own score is equivalent to raising everyone else’s score.
A fractional hedonic game is called simple if ∀i, j ∈ N : vi(j) ∈ {0, 1} and
is called symmetric if ∀i, j ∈ N : vi(j) = vj(i). Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein
show that even in fractional hedonic games which are both simple and symmetric,
the core is sometimes empty and that checking core emptiness is Σp2 -complete.
3.2 Friend and Enemy Oriented Hedonic Games
[Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung, 2006] In both of these kinds of games, i
splits the other players in N into a set of friends, Fi, and a set of enemies, Ei.
In friend-oriented games, i prefers coalitions with more friends and breaks
ties by considering the number of enemies. In other words,
C FOi D
⇐⇒ |C ∩ Fi| > |D ∩ Fi| ∨ (|C ∩ Fi| = |D ∩ Fi| ∧ |C ∩ Ei| ≤ |D ∩ Ei|)
⇐⇒ uFOi (C) ≥ uFOi (D),
where uFOi (C) = n|C ∩ Fi| − |C ∩ Ei|.
So if C has 8 of i’s friends and 600 of i’s enemies and D has 7 of i’s friends and
0 of i’s enemies, then i would still rather be in C.
In enemy-oriented games, i tries to minimize enemies and only considers
friends to break a tie. In other words,
C EOi D
⇐⇒ |C ∩ Ei| < |D ∩ Ei| ∨ (|C ∩ Ei| = |D ∩ Ei| ∧ |C ∩ Fi| ≥ |D ∩ Fi|)
⇐⇒ uEOi (C) ≥ uEOi (D),
where uEOi (C) = |C ∩ Fi| − n|C ∩ Ei|.
Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung show that the core is guaranteed to
be non-empty in both kinds of games. However, finding a core stable partition
is NP-hard in enemy-oriented games2 but polynomial time in friend-oriented
games.
3.3 Altruistic Hedonic Games
[Nguyen, Rey, Rey, Rothe, and Schend, 2016] As in friend and enemy oriented
hedonic games, i divides the other players into friends, Fi, and enemies, Ei. The
idea is that a player wouldn’t want to be in a coalition C where his friends were
miserable, even if C had all of his friends and none of his enemies.
Three levels of altruism are considered. Let avg(S) =
∑
x∈S x/|S| denote the
average of a multiset of numbers. And, as above, the utilities ui are defined so
that C i D ⇐⇒ ui(C) ≥ ui(D).
2 More precisely, if you could always find a core stable coalition structure in polyno-
mial time, then you could also find the largest clique in any (undirected, unweighted)
graph in polynomial time.
In selfish-first altruistic games, a player cares most about his own hap-
piness and uses his friends’ preferences to break ties. ‘Happiness’ here means
the friend-oriented score. This is distinct from friend-oriented games in that a
tightly connected coalition C with 6 friends and 3 enemies is preferred to a sparse
coalition D with 6 friends and 3 enemies, because i’s friends in C are happier
than i’s friends in D.
uSFi (C) = n
5uFOi (C) + avg(u
FO
j (C) : j ∈ C ∩ Fi).
In equal-treatment altruistic games, a player takes his and all his friends’
opinions into account equally when evaluating a partition:
uEQi (C) = avg(u
FO
j (C) : j ∈ C ∩ Fi ∪ {ı}).
And in altruistic-treatment altruistic games (i.e., truly altruistic games), a
player prefers coalitions where his friends are happy and breaks ties by consid-
ering his own happiness.
uALi (C) = u
FO
i (C) + n
5avg(uFOj (C) : j ∈ C ∩ Fi).
Nguyen, Rey, Rey, Rothe, and Schend show that selfish-first altruistic games
always have an nonempty core. Whether equal-treatment altruistic games and
truly altruistic games ever have empty cores are open questions. I suspect that
the core is always nonempty in both games.
4 The Simulator
I wrote software to simulate hedonic games and put in on the internet. You can
draw graphs, choose partitions, choose several different player types, and check
the stability of the partition under several different measures. Hopefully this will
help others and myself quickly understand different hedonic games and speed up
the process of finding stable partitions.
http://lukemiles.org/hedonic-games
The website works better on laptops than smartphones. Updates may have
been made to the website since this arXiv version was uploaded.
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